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ABSTRACT 
 
This study examines the announcement effects and long-run stock performance for 
acquirers from years 2000 to 2013. Since acquisitions create agency problem and 
companies in Malaysia exhibit concentrated ownership structures, this study aims to 
investigate four major objectives which consist of the effects of family control, 
blockholder activism, board structures and deal characteristics on stock performance of 
acquirers. In addressing these objectives, abnormal returns from three-day before through 
one-day after the announcements as well as abnormal returns over a 36-months period are 
adopted as the proxy for the announcement effects and long-run stock performance 
respectively. Ordinary least squares regression methods are used to examine the effects of 
the 16 factors on abnormal returns. The results show that acquisitions in Malaysia are 
value-enhancing, which is consistent with synergistic theory. Furthermore, family 
ownership and active institutional blockholders are able to create value which implies that 
family-controlled firms do not engage in opportunistic behaviour. However, passive 
institutional blockholders and fairness opinion lead to lower value which indicates that 
these factors are unable to mitigate conflict of interest between majority and minority 
shareholders. As for the long run performance, Malaysia market can be considered as 
efficient, as most of the analyses show that the performance of acquirers do not differ from 
those of the matching firms. The findings imply that managers of family-controlled firms 
do not have to worry about investors penalizing them, as long as they engage in value-
creating acquisitions. Moreover, institutional blockholders should play an active role if 
they want to protect their investments. Finally, investors have to realize that over the long 
run, there is no trading strategy that could be adopted to earn abnormal profit.  
 
Keywords: acquisition, announcement effects, long-run stock performance, family 
control, fairness opinion  
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ABSTRAK 
 
Kajian ini mengkaji kesan pengumuman dan prestasi saham jangka masa panjang bagi 
syarikat pengambilalihan dari tahun 2000 hingga 2013. Oleh sebab pengambilalihan 
mewujudkan permasalahan agensi dan syarikat-syarikat di Malaysia menunjukkan 
struktur pemilikan tertumpu, kajian ini bertujuan menyiasat empat objektif utama yang 
mengandungi kesan syarikat pemilikan keluarga, aktivisme pemegang blok, struktur 
lembaga pengarah dan ciri-ciri penjanjian ke atas prestasi saham syarikat 
pengambilalihan. Bagi mencapai objektif-objektif ini, pulangan luar biasa daripada tiga 
hari sebelum sehingga satu hari selepas pengumuman, serta pulangan luar biasa dalam 
tempoh 36 bulan digunakan sebagai proksi untuk kesan pengumuman dan prestasi jangka 
panjang saham. Tambahan lagi, kaedah regresi kuasa dua terkecil biasa digunakan untuk 
menganalisa kesan 16 faktor terhadap pulangan luar biasa. Keputusan menunjukkan 
pengambilalihan di Malaysia adalah menguntungkan serta konsisten dengan teori sinergi. 
Selain itu, pemilikan keluarga dan pemegang blok institusi yang aktif berupaya untuk 
menambah nilai, serta ianya menunjukkan bahawa syarikat yang dikawal oleh keluarga 
tidak terlibat dalam tingkah laku oportunistik. Walaubagaimanapun, pemegang blok 
institusi yang pasif dan pendapat munasabah (FO) yang menjurus kepada nilai yang lebih 
rendah menunjukkan bahawa faktor-faktor ini tidak dapat mengurangkan konflik 
kepentingan di antara pemegang saham majoriti dan minoriti. Bagi prestasi jangka masa 
panjang, pasaran Malaysia boleh dianggap sebagai cekap kerana hampir kesemua analisis 
menunjukkan bahawa prestasi syarikat pembida tidak berbeza daripada prestasi syarikat 
kawalan. Keputusan kajian ini mencadangkan bahawa pengurus bagi syarikat di bawah 
kawalan keluarga tidak perlu risau mengenai tindakan negatif pelabur, selagi mereka 
terlibat dengan pengambilalihan yang berupaya mencipta nilai. Selain itu, pemegang blok 
institusi perlu memainkan peranan yang aktif untuk melindungi pelaburan mereka. Akhir 
sekali, pelabur perlu sedar bahawa dalam tempoh jangka masa panjang, tidak ada sebarang 
strategi perdagangan yang boleh dipraktik untuk memperoleh keuntungan yang luar biasa.  
 
Kata kunci: pengambilalihan, kesan pengumuman, pretasi saham jangka masa panjang, 
kawalan keluarga, pendapat munasabah  
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CHAPTER ONE 
    BACKGROUND OF STUDY 
 
 
 
1.1  Introduction  
This chapter focuses on overview of background of the study and a discussion of the 
problem statement. This is followed by research questions, research objectives and the 
scope of study respectively. Finally, this chapter provides the significance of this study, 
organization of the study and conclusion the chapter. 
1.2 Background 
Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) are among the largest and most readily observable 
forms of corporate investments (Masulis, Wang & Xei, 2007). The term mergers and 
acquisitions are used interchangeably by most researchers, however, they are different in 
terms of implementation. Mergers refer to the process of consolidation where the two 
combined firms would become a new entity while acquisitions refer to the process of 
taking over target firms by the acquiring firms where the target firms become a part of the 
acquiring firms. There are three major types of M&As, which are horizontal, vertical, and 
conglomerate. In horizontal M&As, the acquirers and targets operate in the same industry. 
Vertical M&As refers to M&As where the acquirers try to diversify their businesses by 
acquiring targets in upstream or downstream activities. Finally, conglomerate M&As 
refers to M&As between two firms in unrelated industries. 
 
The involvement of Malaysian companies in M&A activities increases year-over-year in 
both domestic and foreign markets. Values of M&As in Malaysia amounted to over 
RM128.5 billion in 2014, or 8.87% of GDP, which represents an 88% increase as 
The contents of 
the thesis is for 
internal user 
only 
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